Difference between revisions of "Applications"

From The Maude System
Jump to: navigation, search
Line 3: Line 3:
 
* Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: full C ([https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2103621.2103719 ER12]), Java  
 
* Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: full C ([https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2103621.2103719 ER12]), Java  
 
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27813-9_46 FCMR04]),  
 
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27813-9_46 FCMR04]),  
JVM  
+
JVM ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27815-3_14 FMR04]),  
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27815-3_14 FMR04]),  
+
 
[https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PLEXIL/ NASA’s PLEXIL]  
 
[https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PLEXIL/ NASA’s PLEXIL]  
 
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-30729-4_24 RCMS12]),  
 
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F978-3-642-30729-4_24 RCMS12]),  
Verilog  
+
Verilog ([https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5558634 MKMR10]),  
([https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5558634 MKMR10]),  
+
E-LOTOS ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-36135-9_19 V02],  
E-LOTOS  
+
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F3-540-36135-9_19 V02],  
+
 
[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10703-005-2254-x VM05]),  
 
[https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10703-005-2254-x VM05]),  
UML  
+
UML ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11784180_28 CE06],  
([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007%2F11784180_28 CE06],  
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54624-2_11 DRMA14]),  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-54624-2_11 DRMA14]),  
MOF  
+
MOF ([https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-009-0140-9 BM10]),  
([https://doi.org/10.1007/s00165-009-0140-9 BM10]),  
+
ODP ([https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-5489(02)00121-6 DV03],  
ODP  
+
([https://doi.org/10.1016/S0920-5489(02)00121-6 DV03],  
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2004.10.008 DRV05],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2004.10.008 DRV05],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2006.11.004 RVD07]),  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.csi.2006.11.004 RVD07]),  
AADL  
+
AADL ([https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13464-7_5 OBM10],  
([https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-13464-7_5 OBM10],  
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_7 BOM14]),  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-06410-9_7 BOM14]),  
Ptolemy  
+
Ptolemy ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167642310001863 BOFLT14]),  
([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167642310001863 BOFLT14]),  
+
BPMN ([https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59746-1_12 DS17],  
BPMN  
+
([https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-59746-1_12 DS17],  
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2018.08.007 DRS18],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.scico.2018.08.007 DRS18],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12441-9_6 DMC23],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12441-9_6 DMC23],  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2023.100928 DPR24]),  
 
[https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2023.100928 DPR24]),  
DSMLs  
+
DSMLs ([https://doi.org/10.5381/jot.2007.6.9.a10 RRDV],  
([https://doi.org/10.5381/jot.2007.6.9.a10 RRDV],  
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0037549709341635 RDV09],
 
[https://doi.org/10.1177/0037549709341635 RDV09],
 
[https://doi.org/10.5381/jot.2022.21.4.a2 D23]),
 
[https://doi.org/10.5381/jot.2022.21.4.a2 D23]),
Multi-Level Modelling Languages  
+
Multi-Level Modelling Languages ([https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100831 RMDRW23],
([https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jlamp.2022.100831 RMDRW23],
+
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-021-00947-1 RDK23]).
 
[https://doi.org/10.1007/s10270-021-00947-1 RDK23]).
  
Line 46: Line 35:
 
* Cryptographic protocol analysis: [http://maude.cs.illinois.edu/w/index.php/Maude_Tools:_Maude-NPA Maude-NPA] has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like Yubikey&YubiHSM ([https://easychair.org/publications/paper/qkkq GAEMM18]), IBM’s CCA ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8 GSEMM14]), and PCKS#11 ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-27152-1_5 GSEMM15]), using unification and symbolic reachability. See [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_1 EMM09]. An account of the NRL protocol analyzer can be found [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.035 here]. [https://tamarin-prover.github.io/ Tamarin] at ETH, resp. [https://github.com/akiss/akiss AKISS] at INRIA, use Maude’s unification to analyze protocols like 5G-AKA ([https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/tamarin/5G/ DC18]), resp. RFID ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-66399-9_1 GK17]).
 
* Cryptographic protocol analysis: [http://maude.cs.illinois.edu/w/index.php/Maude_Tools:_Maude-NPA Maude-NPA] has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like Yubikey&YubiHSM ([https://easychair.org/publications/paper/qkkq GAEMM18]), IBM’s CCA ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8 GSEMM14]), and PCKS#11 ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-27152-1_5 GSEMM15]), using unification and symbolic reachability. See [https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-642-03829-7_1 EMM09]. An account of the NRL protocol analyzer can be found [https://doi.org/10.1016/j.tcs.2006.08.035 here]. [https://tamarin-prover.github.io/ Tamarin] at ETH, resp. [https://github.com/akiss/akiss AKISS] at INRIA, use Maude’s unification to analyze protocols like 5G-AKA ([https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/tamarin/5G/ DC18]), resp. RFID ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-66399-9_1 GK17]).
  
* Networks: AER/NCA active networks ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-45314-8_24 OKMTZ06]), MANETS ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352220815000498 LOM16]),  
+
* Networks: AER/NCA active networks ([https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/3-540-45314-8_24 OKMTZ06]), MANETS ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352220815000498 LOM16]), BGP ([https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2029&context=cis_reports Wetal13], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-21461-5_22 Wetal11], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-28756-5_20 WTGLS12]); DDoS-Intruder models; and  
BGP ([https://repository.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2029&context=cis_reports Wetal13], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-21461-5_22 Wetal11], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-28756-5_20 WTGLS12]);  
+
DDoS-Intruder models; and  
+
 
DDoS protection ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352220816301651 LDFN18]):  
 
DDoS protection ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S2352220816301651 LDFN18]):  
 
ASV ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1571066109000747 AMG09]),  
 
ASV ([https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S1571066109000747 AMG09]),  

Revision as of 14:00, 20 March 2024

Maude and its formal tools have been used in many pioneering applications:

  • Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: full C (ER12), Java

(FCMR04), JVM (FMR04), NASA’s PLEXIL (RCMS12), Verilog (MKMR10), E-LOTOS (V02, VM05), UML (CE06, DRMA14), MOF (BM10), ODP (DV03, DRV05, RVD07), AADL (OBM10, BOM14), Ptolemy (BOFLT14), BPMN (DS17, DRS18, DMC23, DPR24), DSMLs (RRDV, RDV09, D23), Multi-Level Modelling Languages (RMDRW23, RDK23).

  • Semantics of hardware architectures: MCA ARMv8 architecture (XZ22).
  • Browser security: uncovering 12 kinds of unknown attacks on Internet Explorer (CMSWW07), and design and verification of the secure-by-construction Illinois’s IBOS browser (SKMT12,

SMR20).

  • Cryptographic protocol analysis: Maude-NPA has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like Yubikey&YubiHSM (GAEMM18), IBM’s CCA (GSEMM14), and PCKS#11 (GSEMM15), using unification and symbolic reachability. See EMM09. An account of the NRL protocol analyzer can be found here. Tamarin at ETH, resp. AKISS at INRIA, use Maude’s unification to analyze protocols like 5G-AKA (DC18), resp. RFID (GK17).

DDoS protection (LDFN18): ASV (AMG09), Stable Availability (EMMW12), VoIP-SIP (SASGM09), using Maude’s statistical model checking (SMC) tool. Secure bandwidth reservation in path-aware Internet architectures (WLSPB22), end-to-end name resolution (LDHBVBP23). SCION’s bandwidth allocation protocol (CLBHHMP22).

  • Cloud transaction system formalization and analysis: Cassandra (LNGRG15), Google’s Megastore (GO14), P-Store (O17), etc. (Betal18), using SMC.
  • Analysis of real-time and cyber-physical systems: CASH scheduling (OC06), sensor (OT09) and MANET (LOM16) networks, timed security protocols (AEMMS20), PALS transformation from synchronous to correct distributed real-time systems (MO12, BMO12) enables model checking of complex models such as AADL and Ptolemy models (BOM14) and distributed control of airplane maneuvers (BKMO12).
  • Models of cell signaling used to explain drug effects, identify pathogen attack surfaces, etc. (Pathway Logic). See EKLLMS02.
  • Specification and analysis of models of Concurrency: Petri Nets (SMO01), CCS, pi-Calculus (S00), Actors (M93), REO (MSA), Orc (AM15).
  • Logical framework applications to prototype logics and build and interoperate theorem provers: Barendregt’s lambda-cube (SM04), linear logic (MM02), modal logics (OPR18), computational algebraic geometry, Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker and Inductive (DM12, DMR20) and Reachability Logic (SSM17), theorem provers, HOL-to-Nuprl translator (NSM01), integration of logic and deep-learning, etc. These applications use meta-level, search, and symbolic features.
  • Distributed databases: SNOW-​Optimal Read Atomic Transactions (L22), Replicated RAMP Transactions (LL21).
  • IoT systems: Attack Surface of Trigger-Action IoT Platforms (WDYLBG19), Automated Composition, Analysis and Deployment of IoT Applications (DG19).

Please, help us to complete this page. If you know of applications that should be in this list, email us to duran(at)lcc(dot)uma(dot)es.