Difference between revisions of "Applications"

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* Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2103621.2103719 full C], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27813-9_46 Java], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27815-3_14 JVM], [https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PLEXIL/ NASA’s PLEXIL], [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5558634 Verilog], [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10703-005-2254-x E-LOTOS], UML, MOF, [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13464-7_5 AADL], and [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-10373-5_37 Ptolemy].  
 
* Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: [https://dl.acm.org/doi/10.1145/2103621.2103719 full C], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27813-9_46 Java], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-540-27815-3_14 JVM], [https://shemesh.larc.nasa.gov/fm/PLEXIL/ NASA’s PLEXIL], [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/document/5558634 Verilog], [https://link.springer.com/article/10.1007/s10703-005-2254-x E-LOTOS], UML, MOF, [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-13464-7_5 AADL], and [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-10373-5_37 Ptolemy].  
 
* Browser security: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4223215 uncovering 12 kinds of unknown attacks on Internet Explorer], and design and verification of the secure-by-construction Illinois’s [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-35861-6_14 IBOS browser].
 
* Browser security: [https://ieeexplore.ieee.org/abstract/document/4223215 uncovering 12 kinds of unknown attacks on Internet Explorer], and design and verification of the secure-by-construction Illinois’s [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-642-35861-6_14 IBOS browser].
* Cryptographic protocol analysis: [http://maude.cs.illinois.edu/w/index.php/Maude_Tools:_Maude-NPA Maude-NPA] has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like [http://personales.upv.es/sanesro/Maude-NPA-YubiKey-YubiHSM/ Yubikey&YubiHSM], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8 IBM’s CCA], and PCKS#11, using unification and symbolic reachability. [https://tamarin-prover.github.io/ Tamarin] uses Maude’s unification and has analyzed many important protocols like [ https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/tamarin/5G/ 5G-AKA].
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* Cryptographic protocol analysis: [http://maude.cs.illinois.edu/w/index.php/Maude_Tools:_Maude-NPA Maude-NPA] has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like [http://personales.upv.es/sanesro/Maude-NPA-YubiKey-YubiHSM/ Yubikey&YubiHSM], [https://link.springer.com/chapter/10.1007/978-3-319-14054-4_8 IBM’s CCA], and PCKS#11, using unification and symbolic reachability. [https://tamarin-prover.github.io/ Tamarin] uses Maude’s unification and has analyzed many important protocols like [https://people.cispa.io/cas.cremers/tamarin/5G/ 5G-AKA].
 
* Network protocols: AER/NCA active networks, MANETS, BGP; DDoS-Intruder models; and DDoS protection: ASV, Stable Availability, VoIP-SIP, using [http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/pvesta/ Maude’s statistical model checking (SMC) tool].
 
* Network protocols: AER/NCA active networks, MANETS, BGP; DDoS-Intruder models; and DDoS protection: ASV, Stable Availability, VoIP-SIP, using [http://maude.cs.uiuc.edu/tools/pvesta/ Maude’s statistical model checking (SMC) tool].
 
* Cloud transaction system formalization and analysis: Cassandra, Google’s Megastore, P-Store, etc., using SMC.
 
* Cloud transaction system formalization and analysis: Cassandra, Google’s Megastore, P-Store, etc., using SMC.

Revision as of 23:14, 15 December 2020

Maude and its formal tools have been used in many pioneering applications:

  • Formal definition and verification of programming and hardware, resp. software, modeling languages: full C, Java, JVM, NASA’s PLEXIL, Verilog, E-LOTOS, UML, MOF, AADL, and Ptolemy.
  • Browser security: uncovering 12 kinds of unknown attacks on Internet Explorer, and design and verification of the secure-by-construction Illinois’s IBOS browser.
  • Cryptographic protocol analysis: Maude-NPA has analyzed many protocols and crypto-APIs modulo algebraic properties, like Yubikey&YubiHSM, IBM’s CCA, and PCKS#11, using unification and symbolic reachability. Tamarin uses Maude’s unification and has analyzed many important protocols like 5G-AKA.
  • Network protocols: AER/NCA active networks, MANETS, BGP; DDoS-Intruder models; and DDoS protection: ASV, Stable Availability, VoIP-SIP, using Maude’s statistical model checking (SMC) tool.
  • Cloud transaction system formalization and analysis: Cassandra, Google’s Megastore, P-Store, etc., using SMC.
  • Analysis of real-time and cyber-physical systems: CASH scheduling, sensor and MANET networks, timed security protocols, PALS transformation from synchronous to correct distributed real-time systems enables model checking of complex models such as AADL and Ptolemy models and distributed control of airplane maneuvers.
  • Models of cell signaling used to explain drug effects, identify pathogen attack surfaces, etc.
  • Specification and analysis of models of Concurrency: Petri Nets, CCS, pi-Calculus, Actors, REO, Orc.
  • Logical framework applications to prototype logics and build and interoperate theorem provers: Barendregt’s lambda-cube, linear logic, modal logics, computational algebraic geometry, Maude’s Church-Rosser Checker and Inductive and Reachability Logic theorem provers, HOL-to-Nuprl translator, integration of logic and deep-learning, etc. These applications use meta-level, search, and symbolic features.